Since the mid-1980s fixed-term contracts have been used in many European countries to reduce firing costs. As this strategy may have led to segmented labour markets, recent policy interventions have enhanced permanent jobs by cutting their labour costs. Efficient design of these policies requires knowledge of the costs associated with employment protection legislation. In this paper we evaluate these costs by measuring firms' willingness to trade fixed-term for open-ended contracts in exchange for a cut in the labour cost of permanent jobs. Our results are based on a panel of Italian firms in the engineering sector whose labour costs were reduced by a tax credit granted to firms hiring workers on open-ended rather than fixed-term contracts. The trade-off is identified by comparing how the composition of recruitment by type of contract changed for firms that received the tax credit and those that did not. Potential distortions due to self-selection into the programme, firm-specific timevarying shocks or mechanical correlation induced by the selection rule into the programme, are accounted for by estimating the spurious effect of the tax credit in the years when it was not in force. Estimation is carried out in both a parametric and non-parametric setting that uses p-score to control for different probabilities of receiving the tax credit. We found that firms value the possibility of hiring one per cent new workers on a fixed-term contract as much as a cut in the labour cost of an open-ended worker in the range of 1.3-2.8 per cent. This result helps to explain recent employment growth in Italy, where the share of fixed-term contracts among new hires grew from 34 to 42 per cent between 1995 and 2003. Using our most conservative results, we evaluate that the labour cost reduction associated with this expansion amounted to anything between 10.4 and 22.4 per cent. Given the elasticity of employment to wages, the advent of flexibility in the Italian labour market can account for a large share, between 37 and 80 per cent, of employment growth in the private sector.
How large are the costs born by firms because of employment protection legislation (EPL)? This question is at the core of the renewed policy effort of the European Union, as confirmed recently in the Kok report (EU, 2003) , towards "flex-security", that is the attempt to combine better and more secure jobs with a highly flexible labour market. The basic idea is to increase the number of permanent jobs by cutting their labour costs, thereby compensating firms for giving up the flexibility associated with fixed-term contracts. The efficient design of this policy requires knowledge of the costs associated with EPL.
Recent examples of such a policy can be found in both Spain and Italy. In 1997, Spain drastically cut payroll taxes on new permanent contracts for a period of two years in an attempt to reduce the segmentation of the Spanish labour market induced by the 1984 liberalization of temporary contracts. Firing costs for unfair dismissal were also lowered by around 25 per cent (Benito and Hernando, 2003) . Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2002) estimated that this reform reduced the cost of hiring young workers on a permanent contract by about 10 and 7 per cent in first and second year respectively. In the year 2000, Italy adopted a similar provision by granting a large tax credit to firms hiring workers on an openended contract. The implied cut in labour costs has been evaluated at between 9 per cent and nearly 60 per cent depending on both the industry and the geographical area (Cipollone and Guelfi, 2003) .
Knowledge of the value firms attach to flexible contracts is crucial for an optimal design of this type of compensation policy. Despite the simplicity of the underlying concept, this information is rather difficult to obtain because of the multidimensional nature of the costs associated with firing. Along with monetary expenditures (severance payment), there are burdens associated with the length of the administrative and legal procedures and the cost of uncertainty. OECD (1999) provides a complete list of the costs generated by employment protection legislation.
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Three main strands of literature have tried to measure the magnitude of firing costs. A first line of research has attempted to evaluate these costs within the framework of dynamic labour demand, 2 which was developed after the seminal work of Oi (1962) . Along this line Rota (2004) estimated that in Italy these costs account for as much as 15 per cent of monthly wages. In a similar setting Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (1999) found that firing costs in Spain amounted to 51 per cent of the gross annual wages of a permanent worker over the period 1982 -1993 . For France Goux, Maurin and Pauchet (2001 found that the bulk of the adjustment cost is due to the firing of permanent workers.
A second strand of literature has attempted to compute directly the cost of EPL by examining the regulation or the actual costs declared by firms. Using direct evidence, Abowd and Kramarz (2003) evaluate that in 1992 separation costs in France amounted to anything between 56 and 126 per cent of average labour costs. Garibaldi and Violante (2005) suggest that in Italy firing costs are equivalent to about 18 monthly wages.
A third group of empirical studies has attempted to quantify the size of firing costs by estimating their impact on the level of employment. This large body of literature has not reached any conclusive consensus (OECD, 1999 (OECD, , 2006 .
In this paper we offer and alternative way to ascertain these costs by evaluating the willingness of firms to give up flexibility in exchange for a cut in labour costs. We estimate the labour demand for fixed-term contracts compared with that for open-ended contracts as a function of the relative wage and firm specific controls and derive the money value that firms attach to fixed-term contracts. Hence, our framework allow us to infer the value of flexibility directly rather than from ex-post computation. However, the reliability of this approach impinges on the assumption that the relative wage coefficient in the estimated labour demand equation measures a causal effect. In most settings this is a heroic assumption because of firms' unobservable heterogeneity and because the standard response of labour supply to changes in relative wages acts as a confounding factor. In this paper we overcome these problems by resorting to a policy-induced shift in labour demand not directly linked to a variation in wages. To this end we exploit the introduction in Italy, at the end of 2000, of a tax credit for firms choosing to hire workers on open-ended rather than fixed-term contracts.
This regulation created a trade-off for the firm between fewer flexible contracts and a substantial wage cut. Observing the variation in firms' response, we are able to uncover the rate at which this trade-off occurs. We run our exercise on a panel of about 310 Italian firms 9 operating in the engineering sector in the period 1998-2002, which hired both fixed-term and open-ended workers for the whole period.
Identification of the effect of the tax credit on the relative demand for fixed-term and open-ended workers is based on the comparison of changes in this relative demand of firms that received the tax credit and those that did not. Recovering the causal effect means controlling for potential distortions due to self-selection into the programme because of firm time-specific shocks. On top of this standard problem, we need to take into account that the selection rule into the tax credit -raising the stock of permanent workers -might be correlated with the relative labour demand. However, neither of these problems affects the estimate of the causal effect of tax credit on relative demand as long as potential bias is constant over time. In the standard diff-in-diff setting this time invariance is assumed away.
In our setting we can instead estimate the bias because we observed both relative labour demand and selection rule in the years in which the tax credit was not in force. As this bias is always zero in our data, we recover the causal effect a standard difference in means estimator, using both a parametric setting and the non-parametric version devised by Heckman et al. (1997) , Heckman et al. (1998) and Blundel and Costa Diaz (2000) .
We estimate that hiring one per cent new workers on a fixed-term contract is worth as much as a cut of between 1.3 per cent (parametric setting) and 2.8 per cent (non-parametric setting) in the labour cost of a worker hired on an open-ended contract. The estimate suggests that the effect of the tax credit was large. It implies that in the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] firms enjoyed an overall labour cost reduction ranging from 10.4 to 22.4 per cent as the share of fixed-term contracts out of all newly hired workers rose from 34 to 42 per cent. In Italy the long-run elasticity of employment to wages is estimated to be around -0.3; therefore we calculated that the rise in the share of flexible contracts can explain a large part, from 3.1 to 6.7, of the 8.4 percentage point increase in private sector total employment. This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our empirical strategy while Section 3 is devoted to a detailed illustration of the characteristics of the tax credit;
Section 4 presents the data; Section 5 discusses the identification of the causal effect of the tax credit on relative labour demand; Section 6 presents the main results; Section 7 recovers the trade-off between flexibility and wage cut. Section 8 uses this result to evaluate the effect of the increase in fixed-term contracts among newly hired workers in Italy between 1995 and 2003. Section 9 concludes.
The statistical framework for estimating the value of fixed-term contracts
In this paper we define the value of flexibility as the semi-elasticity : 
; this restriction seems to be reasonable in our setting as it implies that firms' relative labour demand reacts in the same way to a change in the relative wage as to a change in non-wage labour costs. This assumption is also embedded in any model in which firms equate labour productivity with total labour cost rather than just the wage. As an example assume, that the production function is a CES
where FT it and OE it represent new hiring under fixed-term and open-ended contracts respectively, then the relative demand for fixed-term relative to open-ended workers turns out to be, in logarithmic form, equal to
, while LC it stands for the total labour cost borne by firm i at time t, ft for fixed-term and oe for open-ended. In this simple framework, σ is the elasticity of substitution and measures the number of fixed-term contracts firms are willing to trade for permanent jobs in exchange for a reduction in their relative costs. If we decompose total labour costs into their wage and non-wage components and introduce the tax credit as a non-wage cut, expression (6) becomes
with E it and NW it representing wage and non-wage costs for firm i at time t; VTC it is the actual reduction in labour costs due to the tax credit. This equation can be mapped into surveys, with non-missing observations for the share of hirings and for wages. 11 Moreover, 10 The survey provides information on the structural characteristics of the firm (number of establishments, industry, geographical location); on the level and composition of employment (employment stock and hiring by gender, type of contract, and level of skill); on earnings (average nominal monthly wages and bonuses by worker qualification); working hours (contractual working hours, overtime work, hours lost, number of workers involved in overnight shifts); union status (union representation, number of union in the firms, company wage bargaining). 11 We concentrated on one-plant firms because for some crucial variables such as the wage we only have information at the firm but not at the plant level.
we chose to deal only with interior solutions and we therefore kept in the sample only firms We only have average wages for each of the 16 job types corresponding to each different contractual position (we do not consider apprenticeship, which is a special contract targeted to young workers) defined by the collective agreement for the industry. These positions are grouped into three main categories (blue-collars, intermediate positions and white-collars) and within each group they are ranked from the least to the most skilled. As a proxy for the wage of fixed-term contracts we use the average wage of the two least skilled groups among the blue-collars and the least skilled workers among the white-collars. We use the remaining categories to compute the wages for open-ended workers. Empirical evidence confirms that these assumptions are not unreasonable. Indeed, according to our data-set, in the period 1998-2002 about 73 out of 100 blue-collar workers were hired on a fixed-term contract, while the corresponding share among white-collars was only 31 per cent. About 87 per cent of all newly hired fixed-term workers were blue-collars, whose share of total hires (both open-ended and fixed-term) was about 74 per cent. Using these assumptions on wage measures, we found that in our sample fixed-term workers earn about 30 per cent less than open-ended ones, a number that is not far from the differential estimated using data from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth. Using these for the average size of the firms, which shrinks to about 90 employees. We conclude that our selection criteria do not alter dramatically the characteristics of the Federmeccanica survey except for the average size of the firms.
A preliminary look at the log of new workers hired on fixed-term compared with openended contracts before and after the tax credit reveals that something occurred in 2001 and
2002. In Figure 1 we have plotted, for every year in our sample, the empirical distribution of firms with respect to the hiring composition by type of contract, distinguishing between those that increased the stock of open-ended workers and those that did not. We used this criterion because it is the rule that allowed firms to receive the labour cost cut when the tax 
Identification assumptions
Following the analysis of Section 2, the empirical counterparts of the two reduced forms (3) and (4) can be written as with 2002 , 2001 , 1999 , 1998 , 307 .....
Here we do not use the direct measure of the labour cost reduction induced by the tax credit (TC it ) but rather DTC it , i.e. a dummy variable indicating treatment status in year t; it takes data for the year 2000, Cipollone and Guelfi (2003) estimate a 32 per cent raw differential for males and a 9 per cent one for females. value 1 if firm i has increased the stock of permanent employees in year t and zero otherwise 13 . As the tax credit was started in 2001 we expect t b 1 and t c 1 to be zero for t<2001. This is the easiest way to identify the effect of the tax credit without resorting to wage information. The rationale for choosing the dummies rather than the actual value for the tax credit is that, as discussed, we do not have a precise measure for the wages paid to workers with different types of contracts. While our approximation seems to be reasonable, it can still weaken the robustness of our results. To overcome this problem we focus only on those results that can be obtained without using any measure of relative wages. Equation (8) allows us to identify the important parameter t b 1 that can still be used to evaluate the VFC by computing the change in the share of open-ended contracts in total recruitments
There are three major econometric difficulties in directly estimating equation (8). The first problem concerns the nature of the effect that we can actually identify. Equation (8) implicitly assumes that the effect of the tax credit on the composition of recruitment is the same for each firm, if different over time. However, if there are heterogeneous reactions to the tax credit, the only parameter that is identified under the standard assumptions (discussed below) is the average Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT), that is the effect of the tax credit for those firms that actually used it. Nothing can be said about the effect of the tax credit for the average firm in the sample.
The other two problems concern the actual possibility of recovering the ATT in our To discuss the identification assumptions we need in the face of these two problems let us simplify equation (8) 
is due to the difference in the composition of the treated and control group over time;
is due to the difference in the trend between treated and control group, and
is the component due to the potential self-selection of firms into the treatment because of differential firm time-specific shock in the years when the tax credit was in force or due to the mechanical correlation between the indicator of treatment status and the year firmspecific shock. In a standard diff-in-diff framework one needs to assume that these three components are all zero.
However, our data sets allows us to relax some of these assumptions. Since we have a panel of firms the bias component due to specific fixed effect can be controlled for by means of a fixed effect estimator. In order to evaluate the importance of the second and third component of the bias we can compare two tOLS b 1 estimated for two years in which the tax credit was not in force, such as 1999 and 1998. 14 If these coefficients are all zero then the bias in equation (10) is zero and we can identify the effect of the tax credit as a simple difference between the mean outcome of treated and control units; if they are different from zero but their difference is zero then the standard assumption for a diff-in-diff holds and we can identify the effect of the tax credit as the difference between two betas computed for years with and without the tax credit in force. This case would emerge if, for example, the joint distribution of the specific time-firm-specific shock ( it η ) and the indicator of the treatment status (DCT it ) did not depend on time and if the trend were common to both the treated and the control group ( 0 = − C T σ σ ). Finally, a non-zero difference might suggest that the A2 and A3 components of the bias affect the estimate of the effect of the tax credit.
We can take into account this potential distortion using as estimator of the causal effect of the tax credit the difference of two differences among betas, one computed on years with and without the tax credit in force and one comparing two years without the tax credit; in our 
The weakness of the parametric approach of equation (8') is that it attributes the same weight to all the control units, regardless of their closeness to the treated units. This characteristic might be a problem if the observable variables that drive the selection process into the treatment status do not have the same support for treated and control units, or have different distribution over the common support. To take into account these additional problems we rely on the matching estimators based on the probability of being treated (Heckman et al. 1997 , Heckman et alt. 1998 and Blundel and Costa Diaz 2000 . For each year of our sample we compute a matching estimator based on the propensity score:
where it w is the weight of the i-th treated observation at time t and ijt W represents the weight that it is given when comparing treated observation i with control observation j at time t. There are many ways of implementing this matching estimator depending on the algorithm used to compute ijt W . We use the Kernel matching version implemented by Becker and Ichino (2002) (13) where G(·) is a kernel function, p j and p i are the estimated propensity scores -i.e. the probability of being treated -of observations j and i at time t, and h n is the bandwidth.
In analogy with our discussion of the parametric case, we can directly read the causal effect of the tax credit from the estimator ATT KMt for t> 2000 if ATT KMt =0 for t< 2002; if this condition does not hold we can still recover the causal effect of the tax credit by computing the difference between two matching estimators estimated one in a year with the tax credit and one without.
Results
In order to implement the strategy described in the previous section we begin by estimating equation (8) 
In the second column of Table 2 identify the true causal effect of the tax credit on the composition of recruitments as the covariance between the indicator of the treated status and the error term is mostly noise. As discussed in the previous section, the implication of this finding is that even a simple difference between the outcome of treated and control units in the year for which the tax credit was in force should be able to recover the casual effect of the tax credit on the composition of the hirings. Therefore one would conclude that this causal effect is about -.40. However, the point estimate of the treatment status for the year before 2000 is large enough to make us uncomfortable about discarding its implication on the ground that it not significantly different from zero. This consideration leads us to include more controls in the equation. In column 3 of Table 2 while at the same time it shrinks the same slopes for the years in which the tax credit was not there (from -.32 to -.25 in 1999 and from -.30 to -.11). The precision of these last two estimates improves marginally but not enough to take their statistical significance above the usual threshold. Hence we cannot reject the hypothesis that the bias in equation 10 is equal to zero. On the basis of these findings we restate that the effect of the tax credit on the composition of hirings is of the order of -.45.
Column 4 of Table 2 presents the estimate of model 14 with a series of additional controls. We include controls for the gender and skill composition of employees and for the share of workers involved in overnight shifts to account for possible firm-specific trends in the composition of the labour force. For instance, such an occurrence would be brought about by the need to accommodate technical upgrading of the production process, or to meet quality standards required by new customers. We conclude that the tax credit seems to have had a causal effect on the composition of hirings by reducing the share of fixed-term contracts in favour of open-ended contracts.
Using the most conservative of the above results we can quantify this effect at -.39, which implies that the share of workers hired on open-ended contracts out of all recruits increased by 7.6 percentage points because of the tax credit. As the average number of recruits in our sample equals 26, our result implies that the tax credit induced firms to hire two workers on open-ended contracts that would have been hired on fixed-term contracts otherwise.
As discussed in the previous section, direct comparison of the average outcome for the treated and the control group could produce highly biased results if the two groups do not 15 These examples can be expressed as an increase in the ω it parameter of the production function (5).
share the same support of the observable variables or have different distributions of these variables within a common support.
To address this problem we have implemented the matching estimator (13). As a preliminary step we have estimated the propensity score (the probability of each observation of being treated 16 ) and plotted in Figure 2 and control group. These results allow us to safely compare treated and control, as the members of the two groupa have a close probability of being treated. Table 3 presents the results of the matching estimator. Column 2 reports the estimator (13) computed on the row data so that it can be regarded as a non-parametric version of model 1 in Table 2 . Results are almost identical to those of In contrast when the tax credit was not in force the point estimate shrinks and the standard errors increase; as a result the effect of the treatment status in these years cannot be distinguished from zero. Taken at the face value this result would imply that the effect of the tax credit is in the order of -.40. However, the same considerations discussed for the parametric case apply here. Therefore we closely followed the parametric analysis 16 We use the implementation of Becker and Ichino (2002) and we balance the observed variables used to estimate the propensity score within each of the five groups in which we divide the distribution of the propensity score. 17 The line emerging from below the box extends up to the data point equal to pc25-1.5*(pc75-pc25), where pc25 is the 25 th percentile and pc75 is the 75 th percentile. The line emerging from above the box extends up to the data point equal to pc75-1.5*(pc75-pc25). 18 Standard errors are computed by bootstrap with 100 replications. 25 and recomputed the ATT KM estimator (13) on the share of fixed-term to open-ended contracts purged by the firm's fixed effects (column 3) and the other covariates used in Table 2 , column 4. The matched estimators applied to data purged of the firm's fixed effects basically tell the same story of a negative affect in the years in which the tax credit was in force, although smaller than before (-.33 instead of -.40), and a smaller and not statistically significant effect in the years without tax credit. This pattern is reinforced when we use data purged by fixed effect and other observable variables. Taking the most conservative of these non-parametric estimates we can conclude that the tax credit induced a shift in the log share
of fixed to open-ended contracts of about -.18, which implies that the share of recruits with open-ended on all recruits increases by about 3.2 percentage points; in absolute terms this result implies that, on average for the sample, the tax credit induced firms to shift one new worker from a fixed-term to an open-ended contract.
Evaluation of the value of flexible contracts
Estimates of the reaction of the log of relative demand ) log( oe ft H H serve to compute the value of flexible contracts (VFC). Note, however, that the reduction in labour cost due to tax credit (i.e. the numerator of the formula defying the VFC) was limited in time, lasting at most three years. Therefore the expected cut in labour cost associated with the tax credit changes with the expected tenure: the longer the duration of the employment spell of the newly hired permanent worker, the lower the reduction in the labour cost associated with the tax credit. In Graph 3 we compute the value of flexible contracts for an employment spell ranging from 1 to 30 years. 19 The two lines in the graph are computed using as a measure of the effect of the tax credit the most conservative estimates obtained with the parametric method (-.39 in Table 2 ) and the non-parametric method (-.18 in Table 3 ). Since the average firm in the sample hires about 26 people a year and therefore one new workers is equivalent to 3.8 per cent of new staff, our result suggests that an average firm would be indifferent between hiring one worker on a fixed-term contract and the same
worker on an open-ended contract provided his wage is reduced by anything between 5 and 10.7 percentage points.
Implications for aggregate employment growth
The results of the previous section can help to explain the rather puzzling dynamics and 22 per cent. In Italy the long-run elasticity of employment to wages is estimated at around -0.3; therefore, applying the value of flexible contract for engineering firms to the smaller this coefficient the better the approximation. We have estimated this coefficient using the same technique as for the estimation of t b 1 and our results suggest that it is close to zero.
whole private sector, we can calculate that the rise in the share of flexible contracts raised the long-run level of employment by 3.1-6.7 percentage points.
Conclusions
In this paper we estimate the value firms attach to flexible labour contracts. We rely on 
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